REGULATORY MADNESS - WHERE WILL IT END?
More often than not, regulation is a cover-up for exploitation or
protectionism - probably both. Invasive regulation is contagious.
Traders and consumers like to believe that highly regulated markets
serve their best interests, and it suits governments to feel that they
are doing the right thing for their citizens by setting up an elaborate
regulatory system to protect their interests. This knee-jerk response
to every perceived ill has led to a proliferation of regulatory agencies,
causing more confusion than carity.
Coping, for example, with the torrent of financial crimes and
misdemeanours begs the obvious question of which overstretched
regulator should respond to a particular wrongdoing. Financial
Conduct Authority (FCA)? Financial Services Authority (FSA)?
Financial Reporting Council (FRC), now replaced by the Audit,
Reporting and Governance Authority (ARGA)? Prudential Regulatory
Authority (PRA), Competition & Markets Authority (CMA)? I can
hardly keep up!
The scope for overlap between the respective remits of this veritable
alphabet soup of busybodies is legion. Each has its own committees
composed of great and good retired professionals, acting in multiple
arenas of banking, pensions, financial reporting, trading standards,
insurance, mortgage lending - you name it - each covered by its own
ombudsman, with the perennial risk that any particular injustice will
fall through the cracks.
They extract millions in fines and penalties from perceived
wrongdoers - but none of it is applied to compensate the victims.
This continuing charade amounts to little more than an unvarnished
extortion racket by regulatory agencies whose elaborate form masks
their total unfitness for purpose.
The worst currency abuse the world has ever witnessed, the wanton
destruction of purchasing power through programmes of flagrant
money-printing, has been perpetrated by central banks whose
supposed regulatory role should set the standard for the entire
financial sector. Yet those supreme regulators, the Bank of England
and the European Central Bank, have the gall to impose stress tests on commercial banks whose threadbare balance sheets reflect
wounds resulting from central banks' own profligacy.
Let's examine this woeful predicament in a little more detail.
(i) Penalties. Financial penalties levied by regulators at the
corporate level not only fail to compensate victims, but appear to
have little deterrent value as instruments of reform. Why else would
the same charade be repeating itself, over and over?
(i) Findings. Adverse findings and associated penalties have a
negative impact on entities' share prices, thereby inflicting
unwarranted further damage to the savings of innocent shareholders
again, the wrong target.
(ii) Rewarding the reprobates. The reprobates who mastermind
and orchestrate the mis-selling, market rigging -indeed the entire
panoply of inventive violations - are rarely made to suffer personal
retribution for their misdeeds. Concepts of humiliation and
redemption are meaningless to them, as amply evidenced by the
nauseating levels of executive pay that persist
(iv) Auditors of companies that purchase packages of spurious
bonds (however labelled) seem content to vet every aspect of the
transactions - except the current value of what's actually in the
packages. Auditing? Hardly, but they and the masterminds behind the
fudged accounting valuations may weli be members of the same firm.
(v) Bond issuers. The companies issuing those bonds also had
auditors. But when these companies issued paper with arcane titles
(such as "reverse convertibles", or bonds that can be converted into
equity if the issuer can no longer pay the interest; or "collateralised
debt obligations", being parcels of mixed mortgage debts ranked by
"quality", each providing the collateral for the others; and a range of
other "asset-backed securities") their auditors simply closed their
eyes to the impending litigious tempest about to threaten the
solvency of their "clients"
(vi) Regulators. Where are the regulators when dubious accounting
practices are used to contrive Triple A' rating for parcels of near
worthless bonds? Where are they when auditors assess the adequacy
of bondholders' loss provisions using "mark-to-market" criteria?
(vi) Accounting. Accounting rules for loss provisioning require the
"incurred" loss model to be used for valuing debt instruments. This permits the dross to be included in holders' balance sheets at book
value - until they are compelled to face reality and write them off,
perhaps years after the "expected" loss model would have
crystallized those losses. How's that for the corporate version of
kicking the can down the road?
(vii) Government. Government's mindless protection of banks has
corrupted normal market processes of determining executive
remuneration. Left to the market, pay at all levels of management
tends to be higher in the most successful institutions, where wise
executive management is at a premium. But when government
provides guarantees for insurance of deposits, as well as implicit
promises of a bailout if all goes wrong, executive pay is set free of the
market. Ignorance and greed become rampant. When government
and institutions connive in corruption, what hope is there for
effective regulation?
(ix) Citizens. If you throw loans at people, consciences will become
unanchored and immobilised. They will soon become heedless of the
constraint of eventual repayment.
Final thought
All of the above applied at the time of the last financial meltdown, but
that makes it no less (indeed, even more) relevant today. The same
spurious phenomena persist, possibly wearing more inventive cloaks
but incentives for masking dirty deeds are as strong as ever
Of one thing we can be sure - no matter how many regulators are
installed, they may delay, but never prevent the inexorable
implosion.